





This article summarises and reflects a more extensive analysis 
about the experiences of attempts to develop and apply analytical 
tools to comprehend the transformation of Indonesian democracy 
over 15 years. Such attempts can be retrospectively classified into 
four phases: (1) conducted in the mid-1990s to the fall of Soeharto 
in May 1998 by focusing on the anti-Soeharto democracy actors; (2) 
participatory case studies of the post-Soeharto democracy movement; 
(3) the development of an alternative framework for national surveys 
of the problems and options of democratisation from below that 
began in 2003; (4) institutionalisation of the previous surveys and 
case studies of power and democracy. These prolonged experiences 
have opened up the possibilities for academics and practitioners to 
develop and apply an alternative framework for a less elitist and 
more inclusive model of democracy in Indonesia. 
Introduction
The predominant thesis since the 1980s in the social 
sciences, as well as among practitioners, that it is possible to foster 
democracies around the world by crafting liberal institutions by 
way of internationally supported pacts between moderate elites and 
civil societies, is increasingly subject to critique. Counter arguments 
point to the importance of stronger state institutions and more 
favourable social and economic circumstances. This may well be 
right, but does it mean that democracy must be restrained while 
enlightened rightist or leftist elites create better conditions? A third 
and less extreme position which is advanced in this essay is that 
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even imperfect and early elements of democracy may generate more 
favourable opportunities for popular engagement in improving the 
structural conditions for democratic routes to human development. 
However, as this gradualism, or transformative 
democratisation,  is based on the primacy of politics, it presupposes 
the best possible knowledge of the problems and options available. 
So what can scholars, students, journalists, aid experts and civil 
society activists do to increase the understanding of democratisation 
and, therefore, promote it? 
This essay summarises a more extensive analysis published 
separately about the experiences of pioneering attempts over 
a period of 15 years to develop and apply analytical tools for 
academically rigorous, yet participatory, nation-wide surveys and 
representative case studies on the transformation of the third largest 
democracy in the world, Indonesia. Although not initially planned, 
in retrospect we can identify four phases of this work to date: the 
first from the mid-1990s to the fall of Soeharto in May 1998, which 
resulted in case studies focusing on the anti-Soeharto democracy 
actors and based on the activists’ own experiences (Budiman and 
Törnquist, 2001); the second focusing on participatory case studies 
of the post-Soeharto democracy movement (Prasetyo et al., 2003); 
then from 2003, the development of an alternative framework for 
comprehensive country-wide surveys of the problems and options 
of democracy from below – again, on the basis of activists’ own 
experiences (Priyono et al., 2007; Samadhi and Warouw, 2009); 
finally, since late 2008, the attempts to institutionalise broad 
surveys and case studies of power and democracy within the kind 
of public universities where the whole process originated back in 
the early 1990s, before state repression ended this only for the 
whole process to be rescued later in partnership with civil society 
organisations. In addition to outlining the results themselves, 
particularly those from country-wide surveys, this essay will also, 
and primarily, focus on organisational and analytical lessons that 
may be useful to concerned scholars, activists and international 
supporters of democracy operating in other contexts.
Towards an alternative
The Soeharto regime collapsed because of mounting 
contradictions between autocratic rule on the one hand and, on the 
other, primitive accumulation as a basis for capitalist expansion 
which rested with dictatorial privileges but could no longer be 
managed due to increasingly deregulated markets. As the crisis 
became urgent, an increasing number of actors realised that the 
regime was about to lose control and began to abandon the ship. 
At the same time, an increasing number of ordinary people became 
affected by price increases and unemployment, forcing open 
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enough political space for huge demonstrations to be spearheaded 
by students. Finally, by late May 1998 Soeharto had to give up. 
His power was transferred to vice-president Habibie, whose swift 
crisis management, which included sweeping decentralisation and 
the preparation of swift elections and elite-led democracy, delivered 
more radical changes. The pro-democracy movement was ill-
prepared for mass politics. Its members were scattered and soon 
opted primarily for extra-parliamentary action, the return to civil 
society work, or to enter as individuals into top-down organised 
parties. With the 1999 elections, most activists had either given 
up organised politics, lost out in elections with their own top-down 
parties or as individual members of mainstream parties. 
Tracing the dynamics of the anti-Soeharto pro-democracy 
actors 
Did this mean that the conventional framework of elitist 
democracy building was well under way and that there was no 
feasible alternative? A number of concerned academics and, in 
particular, human rights and media activists suggested otherwise. 
The first step was to finalise a book of democracy-oriented political 
actors beyond the general development of various middle-class 
civil society groups (Budiman and Törnquist, 2001). Although this 
research was initiated already in 1994, it was immediately waylaid 
– firstly by the crackdown in 1994 on the press and the dismissal 
of Budiman and others from their university, and, secondly, as 
the potential to oust Soeharto and the New Order regime became 
increasingly clear in 1996. 
There is a major organisational lesson here, in that it is not 
easy to do research with reflective activists and journalists who 
need to adjust to constantly changing political developments. But 
given the subordination of the academic communities, journalists, 
and activists, they were, however, well placed to mobilise the best 
possible sources as well as writing about case studies. The major 
problem then was the nature of the cooperation between them and 
the academically trained analysts and editors in the team. One of 
the main conclusions from this experience was the need for firm 
senior direction.
The delayed study nevertheless contributed to the 
understanding of which actors had enabled the student uprising 
against Soeharto in 1998 and the rapid, yet limited, democratisation. 
The research focused on a number of movements and actors that 
were crucial to the democratisation processes in Indonesia. The 
conclusion was that in making a difference it was the occasional 
combination of otherwise quite divisive citizen action groups and 
more ‘traditional’ movements and leaders behind anti-authoritarian 
and generally democratic demands. Protests grew out of various 
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socio-economic and political grievances, and protests against 
repression. But as the growth of capitalism intertwined with the 
state a major – yet often unspecified – demand was for democracy. 
The only movements that survived, however, were those 
organised in a structured and democratically oriented way beyond 
celebrated and often traditional leaders, as well as loose networks. 
The existing pro-democracy positions were rarely defined even by 
the most advanced actors, with the movement remaining scattered. 
In one respect, however, the positions converged and boiled down 
to something very important – to an agreement. Such advances 
included the development of rule of law, freedom of the press, more 
human development. In other words there was an agreement that 
there was a need for a democratic breakthrough ahead of stable 
institutions and improved development towards less inequality.
Mapping and analysing the post-Soeharto democracy 
movement
As already mentioned, the most advanced democracy groups 
failed to build a broad and well-organised movement even as 
Soeharto was losing power and as he was forced to stand down. The 
second major attempt at research-based democracy promotion was, 
therefore, a survey of the scattered democracy movement followed 
by some 40 thematic reviews and case studies of experiences, 
problems and options. To qualify as a pro-democrat in the survey, 
the key informants – in the form of reputed and generally accepted 
activists – had to agree that the actor was both ‘producing’ and 
‘using’ democracy to reach its aims, not just ‘consuming’ and, of 
course, nor ‘abusing’ democracy.
The approach was very much inspired by the popular 
education movement in the Indian state of Kerala a few years earlier. 
This movement had managed to mobilise and guide reflective and 
often well-educated activists in telling the stories of their attempts 
at alternative development policies. These activists also analysed 
problems and options, and then convened to discuss and agree 
on a powerful joint agenda that caught people’s imagination and 
gained political importance. 
The extensive book based on the survey and case studies 
may have been unique in terms of the combination of, on the one 
hand, basic academic supervision and editing, and, on the other 
hand, the engagement of the activists themselves and, thus, access 
to good sources (Prasetyo et al., 2003). But there were similar 
organisational problems, and signs during the first phase and the 
conclusion phase were not encouraging. Following the broad unity 
against the dictatorship, it became obvious and had to be stated 
very clearly that the movement had not been able to come together 
behind a clear alternative. Some leaders of groups opted instead 
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for linking up with the ‘traditional’ politicians and largely became 
co-opted, while others decided to hold on to principled civil society 
work in usually quite scattered and single-issue groups. They 
were often held together by a specific project – at times with some 
foreign funding. The situation was best illustrated by the title of 
a summary analysis ‘Floating Democrats’ (Törnquist et al., 2003). 
While ordinary people under Soeharto had been prohibited from 
independent organising to, thus, constitute a ‘floating mass’, which 
would not undermine authoritarian economic growth, It was now 
the dissident movements that were ‘floating’ by being confined to 
civil society, politically marginalisation and isolation from  popular 
concerns and social movements. 
Surveying democracy from below
There were two possible policy conclusions: (1) strengthen 
the movement itself; (2) try to enter into and improve the fledgling 
democratic system. The scholars and activists involved discussed 
the matter at a conference in early 2002. Most of the participants 
opted for the latter position. There were two major aims. The 
first was to provide an alternative assessment of widely defined 
democratisation. Most importantly, these assessments would 
be academically solid and theoretically and empirically inclusive 
enough to challenge the elitist and hegemonic framework that 
had relegated popular aspirations and pro-democrats to the 
sidelines. Consequently, the research would be carried out not 
as a development aid project with an external advisor, but in 
the form of a partnership based on academic principles between 
Indonesian researchers and the academic co-director together with 
the University of Oslo. The second aim was to offer challenging 
and unbiased facts and assessments for more effective democracy 
promotion. It was hoped that the committed intellectuals, human 
rights activists, and journalists, who had played such outstanding 
roles in Indonesia’s democratisation, and had contributed to the 
previous projects, would then engage in disseminating these facts 
and assessments and, thus, open space for a reasonably unbiased 
public discourse in lecture rooms, meetings, and the media. 
The only question was how this would be possible. There was a 
shortage of almost everything – time, funds, committed academics, 
educated researchers, reliable previous research, and data banks. 
Once again, a major source of inspiration to move ahead was the 
concerned scholarship and participatory practices in the Indian 
state of Kerala in the 1990s. 
The people’s educational movement in the south-western 
Indian state of Kerala, the Kerala Sasthra Sahitya Parishad (KSSP), 
had developed a scholarly framework for participatory mapping 
of local resources. As soon as local students, teachers and other 
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activists had then collected the data and analysed it, the tentative 
results were put on the table for wider discussion with civil society 
activists, trade unions, farmers associations, political leaders, 
government officials, and others. Drafted local plans were scaled up 
and supported in numerous meetings and at a major international 
conference by the people and the parties that mattered. Leading 
progressive experts and politicians committed themselves to the 
proposals. A few years later, when the same politicians won election, 
the method and the programme was turned into a blueprint for state-
wide and world-renowned efforts at decentralisation, combined 
with a People’s Planning Campaign (Törnquist with Tharakan, 
1995; Issac with Franke, 2000).
The Indonesian was, of course, quite different in comparison 
with Kerala’s long history of progressive popular action for citizenship 
rights, political independence, land reform against caste oppression, 
colonialism, and landlordism. In addition, much of the mass-based 
educational movement that was crucial in Indonesia during the 
struggle for independence had been suppressed or domesticated 
by socio-religious organisations. But various associations of 
journalists, human rights and peace/reconciliation activists had 
been crucial in the democracy movement and were prepared 
to engage. Others who were prepared to engage included widely 
trusted leaders, a few Indonesian and international academics, 
Scandinavian donors and, in particular, The Ford Foundation.   
The model which was developed and improved along the 
way allowed for concerned academics to begin by designing an 
inclusive draft framework for data collection and analysis. The 
framework had to be specific enough to enable a team of committed 
investigative journalists with some basic academic training to guide 
and coordinate experienced and critically thinking activists across 
the country in collecting reliable local information as quickly as 
possible. It was hoped that this would provide good locally rooted 
information far beyond which could be provided by experts in the big 
cities and the mushrooming number of simplistic opinion surveys. 
The other sources of inspiration were, of course, the lessons 
from comparative studies of social and political movements, 
assessments of liberal democracy in general and, more specifically, 
studies of the rule of law, ‘good governance’ and civil society. David 
Beetham’s definition of the aim of democracy on the level of political 
philosophy was accepted as a point of departure because it was 
widely accepted by most scholars (Beetham, 1999; Beetham et al., 
2002). It enabled the identification of which elements of democracy 
were universal and which were contextual beyond simplistic 
disputes about west versus east. It is true that the mainstream 
assessment models were confined to the evaluation of preconceived 
aspects of liberal democracy that were taken out of their western 
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European and American contexts. Moreover, the models focused 
on formalised rules and regulations. Yet, it would be possible to 
develop a more plural alternative strategy. The researchers and 
activists would have to collect information of all the key variables 
in the various theories and strategies of democracy deemed to be 
crucial in the scholarly and public discourse. This meant that basic 
variables related to supplementary theories of social democracy, 
actors of change, power relations, and social movements were 
added to the existing parameters focusing on liberal institutions. 
Accordingly, it would be possible to compare competitive theoretical 
interpretations of democratisation and strategies in order to draw 
conclusions and move ahead. 
By giving priority to theoretical interpretation of the data, it 
would also be possible to avoid two other common fallacies. First, 
one could avoid conclusions on the basis of empiricist statistical 
correlations. Second, one could abstain from attempts to aggregate 
the information about the various indicators and to construct the 
kind of indexes that have been so attractive in media and among 
executives by instead weighing the relative importance of the 
different factors in relation to arenas and principles of governance 
(Bappenas and UNDP, 2008). Any such aggregation and weighing 
of data could be based instead on comprehensive and competing 
theories of democratisation.
Although the alternative method was drawing on mass data, 
it remained qualitative in being based on transparent theoretical 
arguments about how different factors were related to each other. 
All calculations and figures based on the mass data were ‘only’ 
made to discuss the validity of these different arguments. A core 
team of researchers would do the basic analysis and then help the 
activists to supplement contextual studies. Scholars and students 
in universities might examine the data in more detail at a later date 
and thus improve the conclusions.
 In addition, Beetham’s definition paved the way for a 
separation between, on the one hand, the aims and principles of 
democracy and, on the other, the number of institutional means 
that must be contextualised but which are, anyway, intrinsic to 
fostering the broader aims and principles of democracy. According 
to Beetham, the generally accepted aim of democracy is “popular 
control of public affairs on the basis of political equality” and the 
basic principles are participation, authorisation of representatives 
and executives, representation, responsiveness, accountability, 
transparency and solidarity. These, in turn, presuppose basic 
civil and political rights and means of survival. The institutional 
means include human rights, rule of law, free and fair elections, 
representation, good governance, and civil society. Thus it was also 
possible to ignore debates about minimal or extensive definitions of 
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democracy as well as sweeping qualifiers such as formal, substantive, 
illiberal or oligarchic democracies. On the contrary, it enabled a 
focus on the development of democracy in a more disaggregated 
and more specific way. But was this sufficient? No, it was not. 
We also paid special attention to the substance and spread of the 
institutions. What was the actual substance in the politics of equal 
citizenship, and how well was it spread beyond the middle classes 
in the cities? Most importantly, it was necessary to go beyond the 
fashionable focus on institutions (the rules and regulations) by 
also considering crucial dimensions of theories on the role of actors 
and their capacity (or, more broadly speaking, their power) in the 
processes of using and promoting – or abusing and avoiding – the 
instruments of democracy. This meant the addition of a number of 
vital factors in theories of power and social and political movements 
that had proved important in previous comparative studies of 
popular engagement in democratisation (Törnquist, 2002; Harriss 
et al., 2004). Ideally, it would, therefore, be possible to study the 
political dynamics and processes of democratisation rather than 
the state of affairs as measured against internationally prescribed 
criteria. 
We shall return to the details when addressing lessons 
and possible improvements. The important point here is that it 
was possible to construct a better framework. The next question, 
however, concerns whether and how it could be put to use. 
Acquiring grounded information
It was also necessary to get hold of the facts. Research 
on power and democracy had been held back under Soeharto. 
Moreover, knowledge of local conditions was particularly poor and 
fragmented. Most assessments of democracy were based instead on 
the opinions of metropolitan, ‘air-conditioned’ experts, journalists, 
NGO leaders and reliable politicians. This was simply not good 
enough. One shortcut to better knowledge was the use of opinion 
surveys. But aside from the problems of reaching out and asking 
good questions, the most important information needed was not 
people’s views of democracy (even if that was interesting), but how 
the existing democracy was developing and what mechanisms, 
actors and relations of power were involved. In short, there was 
a need to substitute the missing detailed research in a number of 
crucial fields. One should, of course, add such close research, but 
for now the central questions concerned what informants would be 
the best substitute and who would know best. 
Our answer lay with the reasonably well-educated and 
experienced pro-democracy activists on the ground, with their long 
track record and reputation for being able to reflect critically. If 
a sufficient number of such expert/informants could be identified 
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around the country, we would have gained access to the best 
possible sources. These people would be capable, moreover, of 
understanding and answering our insufficiently contextualised 
questions. The main problem was how to identify and engage all 
the informants. Why should they trust the integrity of the team 
enough to commit to answering hundreds of sensitive questions 
in a country with a rather dubious reputation in terms of civil and 
political freedoms?
As in the case of designing a comprehensive and inclusive 
framework, it was hard but not impossible to build a team and 
establish a research organisation, known as Demos, which came to 
be considered trustworthy within academia, the public sphere and, 
most importantly, within the democracy movement. The organisers 
included the most widely respected human rights activist, a leading 
investigative journalist and media educator, a former general 
secretary of the national human rights commission, and a major 
reconciliation theorist and campaigner. The academic director (this 
author) and several of the researchers had proved their commitment 
and capacity in previous studies on the democracy movement.
It was possible, therefore, to build a national network 
– spanning all 33 provinces – of experienced and reliable key 
informants who were prepared to have their track records 
scrutinised publicly. These key informants in turn began to mobilise 
some 900 reliable informants along the 15 or so major frontlines of 
democracy work identified in the previous survey and case studies. 
They also recruited and trained reliable field assistants. The long-
term plan was to repeat surveys over a number of years in order 
to identify and analyse some of the rapid changes over time. In 
addition, the team prepared a series of local surveys to be carried 
out by the grounded activists themselves, with Aceh as a test case 
and a number of thematic follow-up studies of the key problems 
identified in the surveys. 
The harsh reality
 The first major stumbling block was how to reduce all the 
variables and indicators to a manageable number, and then to 
train the team and local key informants on the logic and possible 
theoretical interpretations. This would allow them to train local 
participants and contribute contextual examples that related to 
each of the 33 provinces and 15 frontlines. Ideally, the team would 
have ended up with some 33 ×15 contextual versions of about 300 
questions – a total of about 148,500 specific questions, which, of 
course, would have been unrealistic. 
Thus, attempts were made instead to develop Indonesian 
examples of the general questions, which the key informants and 
field assistants could then use as points of departure for developing 
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local examples. This process was not sufficiently well managed, but 
the informants remained engaged and the team muddled through. 
As well as limited funds, there was also simply not enough time, 
energy, or capacity. Remarkably, however, as we shall return to, 
very few informants dropped out, and it was possible to consolidate 
almost all the overwhelming mass of data gathered from around 
the country without much delay. The second and most serious 
dilemma was less expected – the actual analysis of the data and 
writing up of reports. In hindsight, the problem boiled down to the 
lack of committed Indonesian supervisors with relevant academic 
training, coupled with insufficient organisational involvement of 
the key democracy groups among journalists, and human rights 
and reconciliation activists.
The shortage of committed Indonesian supervisors was 
due in part to having not put enough effort into identifying and 
engaging available scholars and senior students from the outset. 
An additional structural factor was that very few competent 
scholars and senior students were actually available. There were 
two reasons for this: (1) the weak standard of democracy studies at 
the universities and research institutes; (2) good scholars tended 
to be on low incomes and, thus, sought higher remuneration for 
consultancy-type work on expert markets and/or career possibilities 
which we could not offer. Additionally, as work progressed, some 
of the journalistic commitment to public democratic discourse – 
in addition to basic freedoms and professional work ethics – got 
lost with the increasing commercialisation of the media and the 
purchase of and investment in major media outlets by corporations 
with vested political interests.
This lack of local supervisors was a major hindrance in the 
production of the first general analysis of aggregated data. This 
analysis had to be carried out and published as quickly as possible. 
To make sense, the analytical reports had to point to the implications 
for the major contending arguments about democratisation – were 
these arguments refuted or vindicated and were there alternative 
and more fruitful perspectives? 
Quick and clear-cut results were crucial for the committed 
journalists and local informants who were expected to engage in 
public discussion and provide supplementary input. Ideally, these 
discussions in turn would have been followed by more thorough 
political deliberation among civil society and political groups 
convened by the key informants in each province (and clusters) 
to initiate joint agendas – as was the case in Kerala. Meanwhile, 
the central-level research team was to have written up more 
comprehensive reports. 
In reality,however, this was not achived. Although the team 
understood well the data that had been collected, tabulated and 
systematised it was not so well read in the various existing theories 
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and arguments that members would need to confront the data with 
– to thus judge the pros and cons of these often contending theses. 
And while the main academic director was available electronically 
on a daily basis for such discussions, he was only engaged on a 
part-time basis and only physically present with the team during 
three and, later, five intensive work periods per year. On top of this, 
these discussions only took place in English. All these drawbacks 
were well known from the outset but no-one could find a better 
alternative. Thus, the plan was to use regular translations and good 
local supervisors and editors. Although the academic director saw 
this as a priority, in reality much too little attention and resources 
were made available. 
Given the problems of translation, local supervision and 
editing, quick and sufficiently robust reports were not produced for 
the local informants, activists and journalists to work with, except 
for the general executive summaries which were largely designed 
by the academic director. Otherwise, there were constant delays. 
The full potential of the results, therefore, could not be utilised in 
local democracy promotion. The team, the academic director, and 
a committed external editor (Teresa Birks), who was finally brought 
on board, had to engage in permanent rescue missions that were 
highly frustrating for all parties involved. There was also little time 
to involve additional supervisors with good ideas during the quick 
rescue missions.
Meanwhile, most of the local surveys and the thematic follow-
up studies had to be shelved completely. It is true that a special test 
case in post-tsunami Aceh was initiated in early 2005. This was to 
foster civil society participation – by way of local democracy surveys 
and studies – in the local democratisation that was envisioned in 
the report from the initial part of the first national democracy survey 
(published in January 2005). However, the project was delayed 
for a year primarily because it was deemed politically sensitive by 
potential Swedish and Norwegian donors. Following this, it then 
suffered from poor management. 
Instead of commenting and correcting, and commenting 
again, in the manuscripts, the academic director could instead 
have written the report on his own (and gained the credit for it). But 
that would have been to abandon the whole idea of participatory 
research and capacity building. Finally, however, a rewritten 
concluding report from the first survey was produced that was up 
to international academic standards (Priyono et al., 2007). Also, a 
few case studies generated preliminary results that could be drawn 
upon in concluding reports. But up to this juncture, the importance 
of close supervision and editing was never acknowledged. The 
delays meant problems for the democracy promotion work, caused 
friction in the joint work, and called for major changes in the design 
and organisation of the project. 
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Nevertheless, it should be noted that there were huge 
improvements in the conducting and reporting from the second 
survey carried out in 2007-2008. By then a core team of committed 
researchers had received sufficient training and experience. 
They knew how to master the process and make sufficient use of 
instructions and advice, as well as good editing. This testified to the 
fact that the roadmap was feasible, with sufficient training.
Despite the progress made, however, the two strategies 
to tackle the basic problems of analysing the data and writing 
reports had generated additional problems and conflict that were 
difficult to manage. The first strategy to address the problems 
was consolidation, in terms of enhancing the abilities of the 
research team. Unfortunately, this also implied that the research 
organisation become introspective in trying to manage problems 
that were actually rooted more in the insufficient involvement of 
external translators, editors and supervisors than in the individual 
qualities of most of the members of the team itself. Moreover, the 
journalists, human rights groups, politicians and many others 
in the democracy movement who had initially viewed the project 
positively lost some of their own momentum in their own work. As 
a result, their activities were confined to citizen associations and 
continued to operate in isolation from popular movements, thus 
finding it difficult to use the delayed results that did not relate to 
their own specific tasks and contexts. Faced with these difficulties, 
the research organisation tried to manage more tasks on its own. 
Ironically, in doing so it transformed itself into the archetypical 
non-government organisation (NGO) that was identified as a major 
hurdle in pro-democracy work. According to both the previous 
case studies on ‘floating democrats’ and the new survey results 
themselves (to which we shall soon return), such atomised 
associations nourished their own networks and advocacy projects 
rather than paving the way for broader and more unified agendas 
and campaigns. 
The second strategy was to work more closely with 
supportive scholars and students within academia. There were 
three fundamental reasons for this. The first was the much needed 
continued professional development of key researchers. They had 
to be able to understand and apply the theories and arguments 
of democracy to the data collated. They needed more knowledge 
of the methodologies available to carry out surveys and research 
case studies on their own. They had to be able to write good reports 
on their own. The second reason was the need to engage local 
supervisors in order to speed up the pace of the work, improve 
quality, integrate new results from the rapidly expanding university 
studies of democracy, and reduce the workload and dominance of 
the main academic director in order to facilitate more equal academic 
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partnership between him and other international scholars. The 
third reason was the parallel efforts to rebuild democracy studies 
and research at university level – especially at the major University 
of Gadjah Mada (UGM) – in cooperation with practitioners, who 
had been temporarily located within civil society organisations 
under Soeharto. This attempt was intensified in late 2006 with the 
building of a Masters and PhD programme in democracy studies at 
UGM, the launch of an associated journal, and publishing house 
(www.pcd.ugm.ac.id), and joint work with additional supervisors at 
UGM on the production and publishing of the comprehensive report 
from the second democracy survey – a task that was satisfactorily 
carried out in due time (Samadhi and Warouw, 2009). 
The plan from late 2008 was to further develop this cooperation 
between civil society and university-based researchers. Inevitably, 
however, the university strategy meant that academic advisors 
and students would become more influential than had previously 
been the case. By early 2009, Demos group leaders no longer 
wanted to sustain a partnership based on academic principles, 
especially not with the University of Oslo, and opted instead for the 
use of academics as supporting consultants. This was, of course, 
unacceptable to the academic partners – both at the University 
of Oslo and UGM. Moreover, Demos’ primary researchers also 
opted for sustaining the original model, now in cooperation with 
colleagues at UGM. 
At best, the survey work and the originally planned case 
studies will continue within a more comprehensive UGM research 
programme on ‘Power, Welfare and Democracy’ that retains 
extensive joint work with practitioners on the ground and develops 
cooperation with other Indonesian universities and international 
academic partners, including the University of Oslo. With the 
transition of the work to major public universities, however, a 
number of new organisational problems have appeared. These 
relate in particular to how to combine comprehensive project work 
with regular education and research, the challenges of organisation, 
leadership, wages, divisive side jobs, financing, and more. To be 
able to move ahead, these challenges call for additional hard work 
and tough decisions in view of international experiences from 
conducting similar projects at public universities. In particular, 
the project work must contribute to public knowledge, education 
and research, rather than being in the hands of scattered private 
institutes, think tanks or NGOs.
In this context, it is crucial to recall that designing and 
conducting democracy assessments has, within a short period 
of time, become an industry in its own right, parallel to that of 
measuring economic development. The dominant focus is on 
evaluating the sectors, institutions, and measures that donors deem 
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to be fundamental in their attempts at crafting liberal democracy. 
These include aspects of human rights, civil society, the rule of 
law, elections, and good governance. It is true that parties to this 
internationally financed industry, in particular the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), now emphasise the involvement 
of national stakeholders such as influential actors and government 
agencies (Nahem, 2010). The alternative framework under review in 
this essay has even been complimented for having acted similarly 
by being rooted among pro-democrats. Yet, this is only partially 
correct. 
The ownership and engagement of the alternative framework 
by committed scholars and the democracy movement was not 
intended to foster partisan studies to be  adapted to certain 
preconceived norms or needs. As became obvious later on, some of 
the activists involved may well have wished that this was the case 
and, thus, opted out of the academic framework. However, from the 
outset until late 2008, the principle remained the combination of 
the efforts of the researchers, who considered experiences of pro-
democrats but did not compromise basic academic quality, and 
the pro-democracy groups, with an interest in unbiased results, 
an ability to compare contending perspectives and to counter the 
hegemonic assessments of the elite. The committed researchers 
would ensure academic rigour and the democracy movement would 
identify the sources and disseminate and use the results. This 
principle was wholeheartedly agreed on at the time by both the 
executive and academic directors, even if there were insufficient 
procedures in place on how to make joint decisions and insufficient 
understanding of the aims and nature of the programme on the part 
of the major donor. The same principle continues to be sustained 
by the researchers and related activists who now work at the UGM. 
There must be no compromises made with quality and 
academic principles. Facts, issues, and experiences that have 
been set aside should certainly be included. But precisely because 
this often calls for cooperation with democracy activists on the 
ground, it is particularly important that all concepts, variables, and 
questions are formulated as clearly as possible in order to avoid 
misunderstandings. It is essential, therefore, that the capacity of the 
producers/researchers is improved through extended cooperation 
and integrated work with committed students and scholars – and 
their education, research and publication programmes – at public 
universities that honour academic principles. This is particularly 
important when there is a need to initiate the work within NGOs 
or separate institutes outside public universities during periods of 
authoritarian political rule. Also, foreign donors need to support 
and adjust to these principles.
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The survey results
Despite the challenges, substantive and pioneering research 
results with policy implications were produced. Almost all the 
informants in both surveys went out of their way to answer 
the questions. This often called for several sessions and six to 
eight hours work – a remarkable indication of the trust in the 
organisation. Reliability, in terms of the consistency of the answers 
to several related questions, was high. Sceptics who pointed to the 
likelihood that pro-democracy activists would make overly critical 
assessments, were proven wrong. That the responses of senior 
activists were generally quite balanced and nuanced in comparison 
with the regular outcries in the media by expert/celebrities, was 
remarkable. 
The initial executive reports on the results in relation to 
different arguments about democratisation in Indonesia were 
produced in time. The main findings and analysis of the first two 
reports were also republished in a series of popularised articles 
in the leading weekly news magazine Tempo. The same applied 
after the second survey, although on a lesser scale. There were 
also reports in other media by journalists and in the editorial 
and opinion sections of news publications. Generally speaking, 
however, the public discourse was less widespread than expected 
given the initial engagement with the project by journalists and 
cultural workers. However, the executive reports were also used as 
a basis for a number of seminars attended by several informants 
and local activists in regional centres of the country. 
Despite the serious delay of the first more comprehensive 
report and the thematic follow-up studies, attempts were also 
made to develop and foster research-based recommendations. 
The academic director designed initial memoranda on possible 
recommendations. There were two main arguments. One concerned 
the need for civil society based pro-democrats to engage in organised 
politics, not just in civil society. The other way in which this might 
be best achieved was considered through so-called political blocs 
(see further below). 
The proposals were thereafter discussed by the research team 
and a group of particularly interested key informants and related 
activists in Jakarta and the provinces. During 2008, the conclusions 
from these discussions were supplemented by the results from the 
second survey, ongoing case studies, and the conclusion of the 
studies in Aceh (Törnquist et al., 2010). Thus, the full report from 
the second survey featured a special chapter on a so-called political 
bloc strategy. Later, there was also a separate training manual 
produced – although without the involvement of the researchers 
themselves and the academic director. The major conclusions from 
the surveys, thematic studies and recommendations referred to 
above, may be summarised in the following nine points: 
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Impressive but deteriorating freedoms
One of the most remarkable conclusions from the first survey 
was that critical democracy activists around the country, with 
the exceptions of Aceh and Papua, reported substantial advances 
with regard to civil and political freedoms, including in media and 
civil society. After more than three decades of authoritarianism 
and much emphasis on ‘Asian values’, Indonesia stood out as the 
beacon of freedom in South-East Asia. The general standard of 
the freedoms was outstanding compared to the other institutional 
dimensions of democracy. Four years later, by 2007, assessments 
became less favourable. The less positive results related to party 
building and participation in elections, as well as the freedoms 
of religion, belief, language, and culture, in addition to those of 
speech, assembly, and organisation. Similarly, freedoms had also 
been reduced in relation to the press, the arts, the academic world, 
and civil society. 
Efforts to improve governance
By contrast, the informants reported general improvement 
since 2003/04 in top-down efforts by government institutions to 
improve the miserable performances of the rule of law, the control 
of corruption, and also the struggle against paramilitary groups, 
hoodlums, and organised crime. However, the improvements were 
made from very low levels. This indicates that most of these crucial 
problems remain and that even the president seems unable to act 
decisively and demand state authorities come forward with the 
truth.
Country-wide political community
The disintegration of the centralistic New Order has not led 
to the ‘Balkanisation’ of Indonesia through separatism or ethnic 
and religious cleansing that many observers and politicians had 
predicted. What has emerged instead is a unitary political (rather 
than ethnonationalist) community with extensive space for local 
politics. It is true, however, (as has been reported by a number of 
scholars) that this local space implies huge inequalities between the 
provinces and regions, and that it is often occupied by predatory 
powerful groups. 
The relative stability of democracy rests with elitist inclusion of 
people
At the same time, politics in general continue to be dominated 
by powerful elite groups. These groups, however, seemed to be 
more broadly based, more localised, and less militarised than 
under Soeharto. Thus, the surveys and associated research 
qualify the general thesis that the powerful elite from the New 
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Order has simply captured democracy (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). 
Remarkably, it is instead a broader range of elite groups that have 
adjusted to the more democratic institutions. This is indeed not to 
say that there are no abuses, but the surveys lent support to the 
argument of van Klinken (2009) that decentralisation and elections 
have enabled more diverse sections of Indonesia’s elite to mobilise 
popular support. Of course, elites often mobilise such support by 
making use of their clientelist networks, their privileged control of 
public resources and their alliances with business and communal 
leaders. Yet, such elite groups have gained influence by being able 
to win elections, which has not been possible for many of Soeharto’s 
oligarchs on their own. This interest in elections is both a crucial 
basis of the existing democracy and its major drawback. Without 
this elite support, Indonesian democracy would not survive. With 
powerful elite support, Indonesian democracy becomes the domain 
of ‘rotten politicians’ who prosper and entrench themselves through 
corruption.
Monopolised representation
The first four conclusions indicate that much of the minimum 
infrastructure of democratic institutions is in place and is, in spite 
of serious weaknesses and biases, solid enough to accommodate 
powerful actors and, at least partially, alternative actors as well. 
Theoretically, this is the bottom line and the reason why Indonesia 
may be called an emerging new democracy. The major problem is 
that the system of representation and elections is not open enough 
for the possible inclusion of major interests among the people at 
large, and also erects high barriers to participation by independent 
players. Civic and popular organisations are prevented from taking 
part in organised politics, both because it is so difficult to build 
new parties and because of the lack of institutionalised democratic 
channels through which to influence daily politics. These groups, 
moreover, remain hampered by the heritage of previous repression 
and the continuous monopolisation of representation. Further 
blocking them are their own mistakes, fragmentation, and weak 
mass organisation. Supplementary research clearly indicates that 
these weaknesses in turn are related in particular to problems of 
representation (Törnquist et al., 2009; Nur, 2009). 
The risks: A return to politics of order 
The monopolisation of representation nourishes a general 
lack of trust in democracy and public institutions. Most worrying, 
upper- and middle-class groups that rarely manage to win elections 
may well use the general discontent with power-elite democracy 
to gain wide support for alternatives to democracy and to promote 
‘better preconditions’ through politics of order. Supporters of 
Introduction - Research-based Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Indonesia
18
middle-class coups typically say that they aim to prevent disruptive 
populist rule and build stronger preconditions for democracy. Their 
views find an echo in the current international support for proper 
‘sequencing of democracy’ (Carothers, 2007a; 2007b). A concrete 
example is the alliance in Thailand between metropolitan middle 
classes (that fail to win elections), the king, and the military. 
Indonesia has been down this path once before in the 1960s, and it 
gave rise to Soeharto’s New Order regime. 
The challenges: overcoming the constraints of popular representation
It is imperative, therefore, that civic and popular organisations 
be able to scale up their ideas and alliances. By connecting 
communities and workplaces, and local and central levels, it is 
possible to challenge elite control over politics. The surveys and 
case studies suggest, however, that the scaling up into organised 
politics is not only hampered by elitist monopolisation of politics 
but also by the civic groups and political activists themselves. One 
problem is their poor presence within state, politics, and business, 
as well as related workplaces. Another is that the sources of power 
and the ways of gaining authority and legitimacy remain focused on 
knowledge and public discourse at the expense of organisation and 
attempts to gain public mandates and win elections. Moreover, the 
issues placed on the agenda typically focus on specific rights and 
complaints while neglecting broader perspectives on how to promote 
better governance, development, and public welfare. Similarly, 
civic groups remain poorly connected to social movements and 
popular organisations and vice versa. Collective action is mainly 
based on individual networking and popular leaders or alternative 
patronage as opposed to broad and representative organisation. 
Also, attempts to relate to elections, parliaments, and the executive 
remain primarily by way of the media, NGOs, pressure and lobby 
groups, and individual contacts. 
The Aceh lessons: undermined democratic peace and local parties 
The initially successful peace by way of democratisation in 
Aceh was not primarily due to the tsunami, given that the war in 
similarly devastated Sri Lanka continued. On the other hand, the 
more positive outcome in Aceh did not prove entirely right either 
of the two major theses about the role of democracy in peace 
building. These are: that elitist crafting of economic and political 
liberalisation, and democracy, prevents conflicts and fosters peace; 
that liberalisation and democratisation generate conflicts and that 
solid institutions of rule of law and governance must, therefore, 
be introduced ahead of democracy. Actually, alternative attempts 
at transformative politics to improve the conditions by expanding 
democracy were more crucial. It was not a liberal-oriented civil 
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society, in general, but mainly the more political-oriented groups 
that made a difference. The Helsinki negotiations were more 
inclusive and political oriented than the elitist and ‘economic carrot 
driven’ negotiations held in other parts of Indonesia and in Sri 
Lanka. The initially successful implementation of the democratic 
roadmap to peace was largely thanks to the political capacity of 
former rebels and civil society activists on the ground to engage in 
organised politics and win elections. This is in sharp contrast to 
the liberal crafting of democracy and the experiences in other parts 
of Indonesia. The main and current problem is the deterioration of 
governance and democratic politics since the remarkable elections 
in late 2006. Common Indonesian practices of abusing political 
power and making profits from rents rather than production have 
gained importance. In Aceh, new local parties that  were supposed to 
facilitate more inclusive democracy have been marginalised except 
for the GAM-based Aceh Party, which won the 2009 elections in 
an unofficial power-sharing alliance with President Yudhoyono’s 
Democratic Party. It remains to be seen if the reformist leaders with 
governor Irwandi in the forefront, who will now run as independents 
in the forthcoming elections for a local political executive (because 
they have again been pushed aside by autocratic GAM leaders), will 
now formulate a clear agenda to not just win but also transform 
politics and development. 
The recommendation: democratic political blocks
There are two major lessons to be learnt from Indonesia at 
large as well as from Aceh. First, basic popular and civic groups 
must coordinate on an intermediate political level between the 
specific grass-roots issues and the top-level perspectives. This is 
in order to form political blocs to develop joint platforms, broad 
support and alliances, and control genuine politicians – rather than 
being the victim of fragmentation and dominated by various parties 
or political actors. Second, this may also be the level on which 
it is possible to combine parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
activities, as well as representative and direct participation. Thus, 
there is a special need to demand the introduction from above of 
such forms for interest- and citizen rights-based representation – 
in addition to regular party elections – to favour broader and more 
unified organisation on the intermediate democratic level.
Drawbacks of the results and the way ahead
Despite the important results, there were also drawbacks and 
lessons. What was overlooked in the survey or poorly analysed in 
the reports? Four analytical challenges stand out. 
Firstly, a major benefit of the surveys so far has been that 
the informants with experiences from the frontlines of democracy 
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work have been identified in all the provinces, with most of them 
having assessed democratisation from a local point of view. Yet, it 
is methodologically dubious to aggregate such local assessments 
and claim that they reflect all Indonesia. Local- and central-level 
contexts with related institutions and the actors must be defined 
more clearly. Moreover, such results only make sense if they are 
related to the nodes of the local political dynamics. In Indonesia, 
that equals the some 500 districts, which of course are too many 
for a realistic study. Thus, the future focus should be on a number 
of representative and politically crucial districts in addition to some 
central-level institutions, considering all Indonesia.
Secondly, how many crucial dimensions of democracy can be 
covered by surveys? The critique by statisticians that representative 
sections of respondents among the people at large had not been 
included was, of course, irrelevant. The survey focused on experts 
and tried to include the best possible informants in relevant fields 
around the country, although all vital fields do have to be included. 
Others argued that contextual factors and ordinary people’s 
experiences could not be included in a survey. This is of course 
correct. There must be a number of supplementary thematic inquires, 
too – just as in the first case studies of the democracy movement. 
But the major challenge is to combine them. This cannot be done 
by NGOs or research institutes, but calls for broader programmes 
and an academic base at fairly large universities in cooperation, of 
course, with the best possible informants and practitioners.
A third subject of debate is if the framework’s conceptual 
basis in western political philosophy and in related normative 
reasoning means that the framework is less suitable in the global 
South. There is rather broad agreement behind a substantive 
definition of democracy, rather than in terms of vital institutions. 
This is also a precondition for identifying ideal types such as liberal 
democracy and the institutions and practices – from free and fair 
elections to rule of law, human rights or civil society – that need 
to be promoted. Yet, there are two objections. One is that the aim 
of the alternative framework to measure Indonesia not just by 
the standards of liberal democracy but also by crucial dimension 
of, for instance, deliberative and social democracy, has not been 
implemented sufficiently well. The other is that the assessments 
have not considered but, rather, taken for granted a number of 
factors that did not constitute a major problem when modern 
democracy evolved in Europe and the Americas. State building, 
for example, had largely been concluded, so there already existed 
state apparatuses through or with which to implement decisions. 
Also it was fairly clear what people constituted the demos that 
was supposed to control public affairs, according to the principles 
of democracy. With this, a general understanding existed of the 
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meaning of public affairs, even if socialists defined it more widely 
than liberals and communitarians. These three basic dimensions of 
democracy cannot be taken for granted in the post-colonial world. 
The critiques of not having gone much beyond assessing 
the ideals of liberal democracy and of having taken certain 
fundamentals of democracy for granted are certainly valid, but the 
simple answer is that the framework must thus be improved in 
these respects – and that this is a fairly straight forward matter 
which does not call for overly complicated discussions. To begin 
with, the list of institutions to be analysed should extend beyond 
the liberal-democratic ones and also include interest- and issue-
based representation, direct citizen participation, deliberation and 
multi-level and sector governance – not just geographical but also, 
for instance, a combination of customary and liberal systems, and 
direct and indirect democracy. Equally important, to prevent the 
list from being too exhaustive (even Beetham’s original list included 
some 82 indicators and the original alternative approach specified 
32 factors), one may focus on a reduced number of universal 
institutions to foster different versions of democracy and then 
specify critical contextual aspects. Such a reduced list, which 
remains to be detailed in each context, may include 14 factors: equal 
and inclusive citizenship in relation to well-defined public affairs; 
governance in line with international law and UN-conventions; rule 
of law; equal justice; civil and human rights, including social and 
economic rights; basic needs and education, including citizens’ 
rights and democracy; democratic political representation through 
parties and elections; citizens’ constitutional and legal rights-based 
participation; democratic decentralisation without compromising 
equal citizens’ rights; democratic control of instruments of coercion, 
including private forces; transparent, impartial, and accountable 
governance; government independence and capacity to implement 
decisions; freedom of, and access to, public discourse, culture, and 
academia; and democratic civil society.
Similarly, one must certainly pay more attention to the 
constitution of the demos and the specification of public affairs 
and state building. The former relates, of course, to issues of 
civil citizenship versus ethnic and religious community in public 
matters, and additionally to the fragmentation of the citizenry along 
blurred territories, sectors and issues. 
With regard to state building, moreover, a particularly vital 
but often neglected issue is that democracy is not just about 
decisions based on political equality but also the capacity of the 
state to implement them impartially – that is, the output side of 
democracy (Rothstein, 2005). This is not the same as the outcome 
or effect. That the outcome is neo-liberalism or socialism does not 
have a direct bearing on whether one can talk of a democracy or 
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not, only outcomes that severely undermine the fundamentals 
of democracy as defined in the 14 dimensions listed above. But 
if there is a democratic decision about land or health reform or 
an unemployment scheme which is, for example, not properly 
implemented, then democracy is not real. This is not just about 
corruption and accountability – as often emphasised by the UNDP 
and the World Bank – but also about sufficient state capacity as 
well as actors’ political will and popular representation to enforce 
powerful scrutiny. In short, the quality of the output side of 
democracy is not simply if it is decided that there should be proper 
social security for all, but whether such a democratic decision can 
be implemented.
In principle, the problems discussed so far are vital but not 
overly complex. The fourth major weakness, however, is less easy 
to address – that is identifying democratic deficits does not help 
to fight them. As a consequence, there is a need to add studies of 
the processes and dynamics of democratisation to analyses so far 
of the state of democracy. This challenge will be addressed in the 
remaining sections of the essay.
From normative assumptions to empirical analysis
 The definition of the aim or substance of democracy and 
the directly related principles that were adopted from Beetham 
and others are grounded in political philosophy with normative 
elements. The benefit of this approach is the potential for identifying 
models such as liberal or social democracy and what kind of 
basic institutions and practices are necessary. Without further 
elaboration, however, this kind of reasoning may take us in the 
wrong direction. This happens, firstly, when the actual shape of the 
theoretically identified intrinsic components of democracy are not 
identified empirically and contextually before being assessed and 
analysed. Democratic representation, for example, including the 
electoral system, may come in so many more or less developed and 
formalised versions that, in turn, may be contained or promoted in 
numerous ways. 
Secondly, the fact that certain means of democracy may be 
necessary on the level of theory does not mean that they serve the 
aim of democracy in reality. Citizen rights-based organisations, for 
instance, may be assumed to be a vital part of democracy. But if 
normative assumptions substitute for empirical analysis and deem 
such organisations to be pro-democratic and worthy of support, 
one forgets that Nazism and fascism, for example, emerged 
among such associations (Berman, 2006). Similarly, many citizen 
groups oppose democracy in contemporary Thailand. Conversely, 
if only pro-democracy groups are considered ‘real’ or ‘good’ civil 
society organisations (Paris, 2004), one forgets that many existing 
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associations promoting the interests of subordinated castes, as 
well as ethnic or other communal groups that initially are not so 
democratic, may well come to foster democracy depending on the 
character of their demands, such as equal rights for all rather than 
special benefits for various groups (Tharakan, 1998; Davidson and 
Henley, 2007). 
Thirdly, there are the problems of tracing the processes and 
understanding the dynamics. It is true that democracy assessments, 
including the alternative framework tried in Indonesia, could 
proceed from assumptions that institutions like elections or civil 
society could or should foster democracy, toward studies of their 
actual quality as compared to their ideal functions. And it may well 
be argued that these identified deficits should be attended to. In the 
new Swedish strategy for democracy promotion, liberal democracy 
and its theoretically deduced components are normatively deemed 
to be most important and worthy of support. So, whenever these 
basics are missing or dysfunctional, development support is held 
back or improvements and remedies promoted, such as with 
respect to the rule of law (Sida, 2010). But neither the normative 
theoretical assumptions of what is necessary for democracy nor the 
quality of such rights and institutions say anything about when 
and how such components develop, how they actually foster or 
contain democracy, and how they may thus be promoted. 
In short it is not sufficient to assess the extent to which a 
country or district measures up to certain universal democratic 
standards. Also, one must identify what actors, institutions 
and processes hold back or promote – or could promote – the 
development of the general universal dimension of democracy in 
the specific context under review and then proceed to analyse these 
dynamics.
Locating and mapping the processes
 If this is accepted, there are three clusters of additional 
means and dimensions of democratisation to be considered in more 
dynamic studies: (1) the dynamics that affect the development or 
stagnation of democratic institutions; (2) the actual politics of the 
important actors in these regards within crucial issue areas such 
as welfare measures; (3) how the main dimensions of actors’ power 
and capacity interact and affect actual politics. These means and 
dimensions will be discussed one by one.
The alternative framework began by identifying a broad range 
of crucial formal and informal institutional means of democracy. It 
also identified contextual examples of such institutions and asked 
local experts-cum-practitioners to assess their quality in terms 
of performance, spread and substance. There were, however, no 
follow up questions about what factors, actors, and processes either 
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held back or promoted the performance, spread, and substance. 
These should be included in order for the assessments to provide 
meaningful guidance towards improved democratisation. 
 It is true that the alternative framework also considered the 
basic dimensions of the politics of powerful and dissident actors. 
The informants were first asked to identify the major dominant and 
alternative actors and then how these related to the supposedly 
democratic institutions. Did they abuse, use, or both use and 
promote them? This was in order to get a critical indication of the 
widely accepted litmus test for the consolidation of democracy – the 
extent to which crucial actors deem democracy to be ‘the only game 
in town’. Interestingly, as we know, the quite critical pro-democratic 
informants claimed that most actors at least use the institutions. 
Although this was most revealing and negated simplistic 
conclusions about democratic failure, there were, however, no 
direct follow-up questions about the actual politics and policies of 
the actors in various contexts and in relation to specific issue areas 
such as welfare measures. The same applied for the execution of 
promises and policies. This must also be added in order to trace 
the processes, dynamics, and the degree to which adherence to 
democratic institutions makes a difference when it comes to 
implementing policies.
 Political will is insufficient without power. The alternative 
framework also considered the capacity of the actors to avoid and 
abuse, or use and promote the democratic institutions. Having 
reviewed previous studies on power and democracy with reference 
to both dominant and aspiring actors, priority was given to theories 
about political and social movements, the sources and legitimacy 
of political power, and popular representation – all of which partly 
overlapped and partly supplemented each other. Taken together, 
there seemed to be five arguments about necessary capacities 
in order for people to be able to promote and use democratic 
institutions. These have been discussed elsewhere in more detail 
(Törnquist, 2002; Harriss et al., 2004; Törnquist, 2004, 2008; 
Törnquist et al., 2009a).
According to the first argument, people may not be excluded 
from vital parts of the terrain of politics, namely within business 
and the workplace, civil and popular associations, movements 
and means of knowledge and communication, political parties, 
parliament, the political executive, and public and military 
administration. At a fundamental level, this argument relates to 
theories of unequal citizenship and the subordination of people 
through various techniques of post-colonial governance (Mamdani, 
1996; Chatterjee, 2004). A special area of concern is theories on 
marginalisation within the framework of the elite-led democracy 
building of popular-based movements, including gender-based 
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ones, plus interest organisations such as trade unions, issue 
groups, and various citizen associations from organised politics. 
Second, people must be able to transform what Pierre Bourdieu 
called their economic, social and cultural capital in various fields 
into authority and legitimacy – such as symbolic political power 
(Wacquant, 2005; Stokke, 2002; Stokke and Selboe, 2009). Coercive 
capital or force, in terms of militarily as well as people’s power, may 
also need to be included. Bourdieu’s framework for analysing power 
may be particularly useful in contexts of multi-layered and uneven 
development, in which different sources of power are combined and 
transformed, as well as in in-depth studies on the construction of 
the demos and public affairs.
Third, any actor must have some capacity to turn non-private 
concerns into public political matters – to put their issues, interests 
and ideologies on the political agenda. This is the locus for in-depth 
studies of technocratisation, judicialisation, privatisation and 
communalisation (for example,  religious and ethnic communities). 
This also covers the direction of certain issues and problems 
that many people deem to be of common concern – from public 
governance to self-management and charity in civil society. 
Similarly, one may also focus on attempts at re-politicisation of 
such issues, for instance by way of public regulation, delegation, 
the development of public discourse/public service media, the 
combination of customary rules regarding certain matters and 
democratic rules based on equal political and civil rights. This 
relates to theories inspired for instance by Habermas on the public 
sphere (Seidman, 1989), Gramsci on hegemony (Ransome, 1992), 
Bourdieu on ‘habitus’ (internalised norms, understandings, and 
patterns) and the general importance of culture (Wacquant, 2005). 
But the same indicators connect also to analyses of increasingly 
fragmented priorities and agendas, especially among actors in civil 
society, and the related difficulties in generating common platforms 
(see Törnquist, 2002; Harriss et al., 2004; Törnquist et al., 2009). 
Fourth, politics is about collective action and all actors 
must, therefore, be able to mobilise and organise support for their 
demands and policies. This goes to the core of theory on political 
and social movements in relation to democracy. These include the 
arguments of Mouzelis (1986) and Tarrow (1994), distinguishing 
between incorporation into politics by way of elitist populism, 
clientelism, alternative patronage, and related political financing, 
or more integration by way of networks and or comprehensive 
organisation from below. One basic element of this dilemma is the 
inclusion of citizens, subjects and denizens without the capacity to 
use most other rights than to rally behind and vote for or against 
leading politicians (Mamdani, 1996; Chatterjee, 2004; Houtzager, 
2005; Houtzager et al., 2005 and 2007; Harriss, 2006). Previous 
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comparative studies point to the specific problems of combining 
civil society work, social/popular movements, organised politics, 
the predominance of localisation, single issues, and the problems 
of combining special interests and transforming such issues into 
broader matters of public concern. Such studies also suggest that 
the dilemmas relate to three fields of scaling up: (1) scaling up (and 
coordinating) local to central (and combining the two); (2) scaling 
up issues, interests, ideas; (3) scaling up groups, organisation, and 
coalitions (see Törnquist, 2002, 2004; Törnquist et al., 2009). 
Finally, people must be able to use existing means of 
participation and representation and reform them or develop new 
ones in order to approach and influence governance institutions. 
The main source of inspiration is the growing consensus that the 
key problem of democracy in the global South, in particular, is the 
dominance of powerful elites and the poor standard of popular 
representation. This was also one of the prime results from the 
alternative surveys in Indonesia. The main focus needs be on 
different types of representation and how they are legitimised and 
mediated through traditional leaders, parties, interest organisations, 
corporatist arrangements, and institutions for direct participation 
(Törnquist, 2009). A fruitful follow-up question, inspired by Harriss 
(2006) and Houtzager et al. (2005), is to ask people and their 
organisations which institutions they turn to with their various 
problems. 
The collated indicators of people’s will and capacity have 
allowed for fruitful analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
powerful and, especially, alternative actors. However, the major – and 
serious – remaining dilemma is that even this more comprehensive 
framework has not enabled studies of the political dynamics of 
domination and resistance, or attempts to foster alternatives. The 
main parameters have been analysed, but their interaction has not. 
The dynamics of the politics of democratisation
The remaining puzzle concerns how dominant and alternative 
actors in different contexts compete and cooperate by combining 
their will and capacities to avoid and abuse, or use and promote 
the institutional means of democracy in order to foster their 
different ideas and interests. But this is easier said than done. 
The dynamics are multi dimensional and the question is too broad 
to guide specific studies. Thus, information from the surveys and 
case studies needs to be analysed both with the help of competing 
theories on political dynamics and in the specific context of the most 
important processes and political fields. And given the empirical 
results so far, these processes and fields are no doubt the problems 
of democratic popular representation, especially in the struggle for 
welfare measures. 
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What characterises this field and what are the major 
arguments on related political dynamics? An attempt has been 
made to develop a framework for the study of the major dimensions 
of democratic representation (Törnquist, 2009). The fundamental 
of democratic representation is the construction of public affairs 
and the people, the demos, who will control them on the basis of 
political equality. A fruitful analytical framework must facilitate 
analysis of the generation, as well as the implementation, of public 
policies and the attempts to bypass the democratic system. 
The dynamics of democratic representation is primarily about 
authorisation and accountability, which presuppose transparency 
and responsiveness. What is represented may be substantive, 
descriptive and/or symbolic. Substantive representation is when 
the representative acts for the represented. This occurs for instance, 
when a leader advances the interests of workers. Descriptive 
representation is when an actor stands for the represented 
by being objectively similar. This occurs, for instance, when a 
woman represents women and a resident in a village represents 
fellow villagers. Lastly, symbolic representation is when an actor 
is perceived by the represented to once again stand for them. 
However, in this instance it occurs in terms of shared culture and 
identities. Yet, symbolic representation may also be understood in 
the wider sense, as by authors like Bourdieu (Wacquant, 2005; 
Stokke, 2002; Anderson, 1983), of constructing the demos, groups, 
and interests that are being represented and in claiming to be a 
legitimate authority as a representative. 
There are two main approaches. The first may be called the 
‘chain of popular sovereignty’ approach. It is typically students 
of political institutions who adhere to it, focusing on formally 
regulated politics, government and public administration. The 
second is what shall be labelled the ‘direct democracy’ approach. 
This is more common among political sociologists, anthropologists, 
and students of rights and law who emphasise the importance of 
informal arrangements and the need for alternative participation 
through popular movements and lobby groups, as well as citizens’ 
action in, for instance, neighbourhood groups and associations for 
self-management.
There are two related tendencies towards deteriorated 
representation within the ‘chain of popular sovereignty’ in old 
and new democracies, albeit from different levels of democratic 
development. One is that public matters and resources have been 
reduced and fragmented under neo-liberalism and globalisation 
beyond democratic representation. The other tendency is that almost 
all of the links in the chain itself are tarnished. This is especially 
with regard to the intermediary representative institutions – from 
civic organisations to political parties. 
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While the advantage of the ‘chain of popular sovereignty’ 
approach is precision and conceptual consistency in relation to 
democratic theory, the major drawback is that practices outside the 
formally recognised chain tend to be set aside, such as attempts at 
participatory governance and struggles over public affairs that have 
been privatised or informalised.
Unfortunately, however, the ‘direct democracy’ approach 
does not provide a good alternative, but focuses on the other side 
of the coin. Interestingly, supporters include representatives of 
otherwise quite diverse groups. One is market oriented, supported 
by the World Bank (1997), for example. This group favours user 
and consumer participation rather than citizenship and popular 
sovereignty. Another includes Tocquvillians, who suggest that 
democracy works when citizens make use of their associational 
capacities and recognise each other as rights-bearing citizens. A 
third comprises communitarians in favour of local government based 
on ethnic, tribal, and similar communities against authoritarian 
post-colonial governance (see Escobar, 2009; Davidson and Henley, 
2007). A fourth consists of critics of globalisation such as Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000), who argue that state and power 
has been so dispersed and localised that there is no decisive unit 
left to fight and that, increasingly, many producers are regulating 
their own social relations. Thus, strong parties and representative 
democracy are unnecessary and even irrelevant. 
In short, a common denominator in all these positions is that 
they are congruous with the idea of Putnam (1993), that the ‘real’ 
demos develops not in relation to ideologies, institutions and political 
engagement, but organically from below and from self-managing 
and cooperating citizens who foster social capital. Representation, 
thus, becomes redundant since the people act directly through the 
same contacts and associations that have constituted the people 
(demos) in the first place. As a result, almost any ‘civil’ organisation 
becomes ‘part of the people itself’. There is no need to analyse, 
therefore, differences between organisations that relate to rights-
bearing citizens and people who lack sufficient capacity to use and 
promote their rights. 
Furthermore, the importance of intermediary variables 
such as politics and ideology need not be discussed. The fact 
that Scandinavian democracy and welfare states, as well as 
contemporary participatory budgeting, for example, have all been 
politically facilitated and then sustained is conveniently forgotten. 
Many civil society activists are, however, more anxious now than 
before to legitimise their work in terms of who they aim to represent 
(Houtzager, 2007; Houtzager and Lavalle, 2009). Moreover, the new 
institutions for direct participation such as participatory planning, 
are – just like previous Scandinavian experiences of combining 
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liberal political democracy and interest-based representation, and 
cooperation between government and associations – attempts to 
initiate a new layer of representation between electoral chains of 
popular sovereignty, on the one hand, and associational life and 
populism, on the other (Avritzer, 2002;  Baiocchi, 2005; Baiocchi 
and Heller, 2009; Esping-Andersen, 1985; Berman, 2006). But 
a number of questions remain to be answered, such as how to 
guarantee authorisation and accountability, and, even more harder, 
how to identify and agree on what parts of the demos should control 
which sections of public affairs on the basis of political equality. 
As emphasised in Törnquist (2009), there is a need to combine 
the two main tendencies in the study of representation – one 
emphasising the formal chain of popular sovereignty and the other, 
more or less, direct participation and deliberation – by focusing 
on the development (or restriction) of the principles of democratic 
representation in both formally organised politics and government, 
on the one hand, and other forms of governance, including in civil 
society, on the other (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. An integrated framework for the study of democratic 
popular representation.
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Representation and the struggle for democratisation
Let us now return to the challenge of studying the dynamics 
of democratisation in relation to the information collected in our 
surveys and case studies and, particularly, the main remaining 
puzzle of how dominant and alternative actors in different political 
fields and contexts combine their will and capacities over time to 
avoid and abuse or use and promote the institutional means of 
democracy. We are particularly interested in the specific problems 
of the pro-democratic actors, who obviously suffer from insufficient 
links between civic and more popular oriented groups, on the one 
hand, and problems of relating to organised politics, on the other. 
Most importantly, the crucial problem of fostering such links relates 
to democratic representation. 
The problem of democratic popular representation may be 
identified on three levels: (1) links between the popular based 
actors themselves; (2) relations between the popular actors and the 
democratic system at large; (3) links between the public institutions 
for popular representation and policy implementation.
At the first level, in relation to people’s capacity to mobilise 
and organise support, initial attention may be given to what 
individuals, groups, and organisations the people turn to and how 
this is legitimised. With this as a base, one may then focus on the 
efforts, if any, to scale up fragmented and poorly rooted groups: 
(1) geographically from local to regional and central; (2) policy-wise 
from separate to more public issues, interests, and agendas; (3) 
organisationally from separate groups and associations to alliances, 
coalitions, and unified movements and organisations (Törnquist et 
al., 2009).
The second level focuses on how NGOs, trade unions and 
political organisations relate to the wider political system. The 
principal forms of institutionalised representation are: (1) citizen 
judicially regulated rights-based democratisation, primarily 
through direct citizen participation and civil society groups; (2) 
interest- and issue-based representation through, for instance, 
trade unions, women’s organisations or environmental groups and, 
also, democratic institutions, for example participatory planning; 
(3) political-based representation, usually through political parties 
and independent candidates. 
At the third level, the main issue concerns the capacity of 
public institutions to implement democratic decisions effectively 
and impartially. Most importantly, the three levels of representation 
interact. For example, the popular groups may demand favourable 
forms of institutions for representation to be designed and 
implemented from above. And such favourable channels for 
collective democratic participation may in turn be designed in such 
a way as to foster popular representation, including, for instance, 
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special measures for women, and to contain fragmentation to 
the benefit of more effective scaling up by the democratic actors 
themselves (Webster et al., 2009).
Projects, strategies and recommendations
The most crucial step is the analysis of the politics of 
democratisation in terms of the dynamics of various political 
strategies and practices. This should be possible by studying specific 
political projects to foster democratic popular representation 
to promote, for example, welfare-based sustainable economic 
wealth. Therefore, different projects and strategies may also be 
compared over time and in different contexts in order to learn 
from other experiences and discuss the pros and cons of various 
recommendations. 
Another crucial issue is the question of how to promote better 
democracy. Recommendations are often produced in an ad hoc 
fashion and not seen as a solid scholarly exercise, but rather the 
business of consultants and political advisors. This can be avoided. 
Credible research-based democracy engagement is not impossible. 
Having identified the problems of institutions, the balance of power 
and the dynamics of projects and strategies in democratisation, 
recommendations tend to be based on knowledge of the roots of 
the problems. But knowing the causes for a problem is not the 
same as to know how to fight the causes. If the root cause for elitist 
democracy is poor popular organisation, the insights say little about 
how to foster such organisation. The challenges and their roots, 
therefore, also need to be compared systematically with experiences 
in contexts that have faced similar dilemmas and managed to 
tackle some of them. Having considered dissimilar conditions, 
this forms the basis for academically transparent research-based 
recommendations. 
Conclusion
In short, it has proved possible for academics and 
practitioners to develop and apply an alternative framework for a 
more inclusive and less elitist design of a democratic order than 
the mainstream roadmaps. This would entail a democratic order 
that would facilitate gradual improvement of the conditions for 
improved democratisation through transformative politics. The 
major organisational challenges include firm leadership, a focus 
on efficient project work in involving sufficient editorial expertise 
and scholarship, and sustaining both academic quality and activist 
insights and engagement. The main analytical insights include the 
need to focus more on the processes and dynamics of the politics of 
transformative democratisation to, therefore, also be able to learn 
by comparing projects and strategies in various contexts. 
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